This document was compiled by the German commander of
the said Albanian SS Division, August Schmidhuber (1901-1947), from Augsburg in
Bavaria, on 2 October 1944, shortly before the German withdrawal from Albania
in November 1944. This SS Division of some 6,000 men was formed late by the
Nazis (recruitment began in February 1944 and it only received its name in
August 1944). It never reached its operational strength, and was disbanded on 1
November 1944 by which time most of the recruits had deserted and run away.
Major General Schmidhuber, who expresses some none too flattering remarks about
his Albanian subordinates in this text, was subsequently found guilty of war
crimes by a Yugoslav military tribunal and was hanged on 27 February 1947 in
Belgrade
.1.Formation Order The formation order was based on the presumption that
Albania had more or less attained the general European level of civilisation
and culture. In this connection, it cannot be denied that, until recently,
Albania was no better known in Germany than the smaller countries of South
America. This lack of “official” knowledge led to the downfall of a certain
Prince Wied.
After four hundred years as a Turkish province, Albania is in
every way more Turkish than Turkey itself – from women’s veils to their
self-definition as a nation.
(είναι πιο τούρκοι από τους ίδιους τους τούρκους)
SS Commander August
Schmidhuber speaking in Kosovo about the formation of the SS Skanderbeg
Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg Westermann, 1944).
Since the death of their national hero, Skanderbeg
(1468), the Albanians have been vegetating rather than developing. They have no
particular awareness of being a nation or country, but rather still live on,
like the old Germanic tribes, in a clannish, tribal mindset. The history of the
Albanian people since the death of Skanderbeg could be best compared to the
state of Germany if the German nation had brought forth no leaders since the
death of Hermann, chieftain of the Cherusci. As to Albanian society, the people
in the countryside who make up 85-90% of the population, live under the
mediaeval feudal reign of their bey and aghas. Not only do the tenant farmers
have to give their landlords a good portion of their produce, they also have to
serve them in the defence of their tribal territory. Not only is the Albanian
harshly oppressed by his landlord, he is also used and abused by the latter in
local politics. There is no way he can get around it.The formation order was
based on the following erroneous military and organisational assumptions:The
Albanians had never had any real regular troops in the German sense. The
military formations that existed in Albania, including the uniformed militia
set up by the Italians, only became quasi-military bodies when they were given
uniforms. There was no internal consistency. The lack of disciple, being the
principal trait of the Albanian, was not gradually overcome in the Italian militia.
It was willingly cultivated. For the Albanian, discipline means a restriction
of his freedom, something that he naturally opposes. The Albanians live freely
and independently just as nature created them, and they do what they want. They
have time. They do not want to fight in military formations, but in their own
bands, and there is no regulated discipline in these bands of theirs. When it
starts raining, the Albanian abandons his post. When it gets dark, he leaves
his position and goes back to the village for a glass of raki. When he has been
on duty for 12 days, he goes back home for 4-5 days without even asking the
leader of his band, and then he returns, or not… He does not like military
exercise or shooting practice. His said ability to shoot accurately is a myth.
What he loves most is simply firing his gun, whenever possible while sitting
behind a protective barrier and shooting, trigger-happy, into the air. Even the
so-called regular Albanian troops do this, although there is only one battalion
of them left. The Albanian hunger for more and more ammunition knows no bounds.
He has no understanding of or interest in the fact that the ammunition is
produced in German factories by women and girls, while the strong young men of
Albania sit around in cafés or crouch lazily in market corners. He therefore
sees no reason to limit its use.The courage and heroism of the Albanian is
another myth. You can more or less chase an Albanian around the globe with a
light mortar. While on the attack, he will only go so far, up to where he can
find something to steal or plunder. Once he has captured a goat, a ploughshare
or the wheel of a sewing machine, the war is over for him and he goes
home.While on the defence, the Albanians are extremely nervous at the sound of
mortar fire. Under such conditions, it is absolutely essential that the officer
corps be large enough. For 20 Albanians, you need two German officers – one to
lead them and the other one to keep watch behind them.
Recruitment of
Kosovo Albanians into the SS Skanderbeg Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg
Westermann, 1944).
With regard to uniforms, the
instructors often had the same problems as they did with the Negroes. It was
the first time in their lives that most of the recruits had ever worn shoes on
their feet. They were very proud of them and kept them on all night. On the
other hand, whenever they were faced with a longer march, they took the shoes
off and hung them around their shoulders. Whenever an Albanian has to flee, the
first thing he does is to throw his shoes away so that he can run faster.
Getting the Albanians used to wearing proper uniforms is a major
accomplishment, if it can be done at all.All of these traits should have made
it more important to set up the officer corps first and then fill the ranks
with Albanian recruits. There is no alternative to this work-saving and
time-saving method to set up contingents in primitive Albania in wartime.
2.The Formation of the Division
This section refers primarily to Kosovo, the region
destined for the formation of the SS Skanderbeg Division. More than anything
else, the formation of the Division was countered by the invisible resistance
of the beys and aghas. This, in turn, was reflected in the passiveness of the
prefects and mayors submissive to the beys and in hostile rumours and
propaganda.
Recruitment of Kosovo Albanians into the SS Skanderbeg
Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg Westermann, 1944).
The National Committee and the authorities did nothing
to inform the population about the aims and objectives of the formation of an
Albanian SS division. It was the Division Commander himself who had to explain
this in public speeches on market days in all the towns of Kosovo.The promises
made by the then president of the Albanian National Committee in Prizren, Bedri
Pejani, that were given in writing to the Reichsführer SS, were no better than all the other Albanian promises.
Bedri Pejani himself, who has since been replaced by the former minister of the
interior, Deva, is a classic political impostor who, throughout his lifetime,
has managed to lead the good life by interfering in politics both abroad and in
the country itself. Like most so-called Albanian politicians, he doesn’t care
at all where the money comes from so long as it fulfils the exorbitant demands
of his lifestyle. The formation of the Division in the size originally planned
would perhaps have been easier if the Division Commander had gone around with a
sack of gold and distributed it among the important beys. They would then have
ensured that he had enough recruits from among their tenants. If someone in
Albania offers you his friendship, he will first ask you: “How much gold will
you give me?” The issue was simply that there were certain people who wanted to
make a profit out of the formation of an Albanian division.
Recruitment of
Kosovo Albanians into the SS Skanderbeg Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg
Westermann, 1944).
As to the call-ups, the
deadlines for which were mostly not taken too seriously, only average and
shabby men turned up. The muscle-bound farm boys stayed behind in their
villages.Recruitment was as follows as of 25 September 1944: 11,398 men, of
whom 9,275 were found fit for service. Of these, 6,491 were actually
recruited.The prefects and mayors did nothing to force those called up to
actually enlist. The great majority of the population interpreted this passive
reaction of the prefects and mayors as an invitation to regard the formation of
the Division as something unofficial and unimportant, and simply ignored
it.Those who were interested in the formation of the Division were frustrated
in seeing that only the poor were called up, whereas the sons of the beys and
merchants in the towns were able to get out of military service by connections
and bribes.
Recruitment of Kosovo Albanians into the SS Skanderbeg
Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg Westermann, 1944).
On 1 May 1944, the National Committee had promised the
Division a recruitment of 10,000 men. Actually, the Division must have been
secretly relieved at that time that the Albanian authorities had done so little
to get the Division set up, because the accommodation facilities were all in a
neglected state and there were no instructors or medical personnel available,
not to speak of the lack of weapons, materiel and uniforms.The only people who
were ready in that short period of time were the administration employees of
the Division who, because of their broad-based training, were able to serve as
instructors. In the administration, the Untersturmführer served, for instance, as a unit commander, the chief
accountant served as a company commander, and the cashier served as a platoon
commander. The cashier was responsible for the training of an average of 50
Albanians, and gave them the best he could. The SS Main Administrative Office
thus made the greatest contribution to the formation of the Division of any
service.The Division also received major assistance from the representative of
the Reichsführer SS in Tirana, SS Gruppenführer Fitzthum, who provided the Division with police
officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors and gave the Division
Commander a cross-country motor vehicle so that he could move around. He also
made sure that the Division had the funds it required in local currency. The
Division always received all the support it needed from the 21st Army Corps to
which it was tactically subordinate, and directly from the Supreme Command of
the 2nd Tank Army. The 21st Army Corps provided one officer and 12
non-commissioned officers as instructors.Nothing could be expected from the 5th
SS Mountain Corps because it had nothing to offer. The Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung transferred to the Division was considered from
the date of transfer as being under the command of the 5th SS Mountain Corps.
Recruitment of
Kosovo Albanians into the SS Skanderbeg Division(photo: Kriegsberichter Georg
Westermann, 1944).
The lead squadron of the
Division initially had no Ia, Ic or military court. The Ia given to the
Division only stayed around for eight days. It was only thanks to the head of
the Main Office of the SS that a functioning Division staff was set up. He had
command over the specially trained personnel of the SS Main Office that he
transferred to the Division at the latter’s request.From the start, the
Albanian battalion of the SS ‘Hanschar’ Armed Mountain Division, transferred to
our Division in early May, retained a separate status as a combat-ready
battalion to deal with the bands along the border.In May and June, funding in
Albanian currency could only be provided to a limited extent, certainly not
enough to cover wages and family support in case of a mass recruitment to the
Division.
3.Operations
The red bandits along the Albanian-Montenegrin border
were, of course, well aware of our intention of setting up an SS Skanderbeg Division.
It was evident that they would not allow us to form a force opposing them
without doing what they could to prevent it.One result, in the interior of
Kosovo, was an increase in Communist propaganda. In two surprise operations,
the Division therefore arrested all the Jews (281) and broke up a large
Communist organisation that comprised a total of 210 Communist functionaries.
We used the intervening pause, having eliminated many Communist agents and
couriers, to carry out quick and intensive training, so that we would be
functional as quickly as possible.However, the Division suffered substantially
in this period from the lack of arms supplies for the following operations. The
first operations were carried out immediately after the six-week training period,
although the Division did not have sufficient arms: machine-guns, mortars,
machine pistols, flare guns, and heavy weapons. Despite this, many elements of
the Division, especially the former prisoners of war of the Yugoslav Army,
performed very well. The vast majority of the men, however, proved to be
cowardly in battle and, when under enemy attack, especially with heavy weapons
not used by our side, they simply fled.In this connection, I suspect that the
formation of the SS Skanderbeg Armed Mountain Division was the reason why the
Anglo-Americans provided the partisans on the Albanian-Montenegrin border with
more weapons, medical supplies and uniforms. This was evident in the first
operation where the enemies were no longer bandits in the normal sense of the
word, but regular disciplined and well-equipped troops with proper English
uniforms, under a skilled and flexible command structure, and in superior
numbers. One German machine gun was faced with about 30 English machine guns.
The enemy had more machine pistols than the German side had rifles. The
Anglo-Americans and Bolsheviks also had the advantage that they had
Montenegrins under their command, and not Albanians.Another disadvantage on our
side was the total lack of communications, in particular radios, in these
operations. It could easily be said that the troops and the bandits had
exchanged roles in these fights.The Division suffered the following losses in
these operations:166 men missing in action, of whom 14 Germans and 152
Albanians,92 men wounded, of whom 20 Germans and 72 Albanians,56 men killed, of
whom 8 Germans and 48 Albanians.
4.Political and
Military Change in the Balkans and its Impact on the Division Region
Contrary to expectations, when Turkey joined the
Allies, the move had no visible impact on the Muslim Albanians, although the
population was constantly listening to radio programmes from Ankara and in the
towns of Prizren and Prishtina most of the people spoke Turkish and not
Albanian.There was, however, a great reaction when Romania and then Bulgaria
betrayed the Axis, followed by Finland, although the latter country was not of
much interest to the Albanians because it was so far away and relatively
unknown. This reaction was seen primarily in a revival of the propaganda of the
beys that was hostile to the Division. Their slogans this time were “Get away
from the Germans in time!” and “No Albanians Fighting Albanians!”The Albanians
remembered the end of the Great War; they experienced the swift collapse of
Yugoslavia and the disgraceful implosion of Italy. They were expecting Germany
to suffer the same fate. The noticeably swift withdrawal of some rearguard
elements and the departure of the OT [Todt Organisation], of the mining
company, and of all female German personnel etc. reinforced this perception
among the Albanians because the retreat looked at times as if the Germans were
fleeing. The Albanians were perched there like vultures ready to plunder and
attack disintegrating German forces in order to increase their stocks of
weapons and ammunition, as they had done with Yugoslavia and Italy. This
objective was at the origin of a major band attack carried out by some 1,500
bandits on 11 September 1944 in Gjakovica [Gjakova]. It was later made known
that many of the surrounding villages had taken part in this attack, which was
put down by a counterattack on the outskirts of Gjakovica on 13 September 1944.
Our side suffered 10 deaths, the bandits 104 deaths. The fighting group of the
Division staff played the determining role in this venture, in view of the lack
of actual troops.Nationalist Albanians hoped that the Germans would be replaced
by the English before the Bolsheviks reached Albania. In its propaganda, the
Division stressed that an Anglo-American occupation would actually lead indirectly
to Bolshevik rule in Albania.The slogan “No Albanians Fighting Albanians!” was
potentially more dangerous for us because it did much to paralyse the fight
against the Communist bands. However, our propaganda won out because of how the
Communist bands behaved. They rashly attacked both anti-German and
anti-Communist bands and burnt down their villages. This caused the Nationalist
bands to join forces and eventually to turn to the German Wehrmacht
for
support, which some of them are now doing.Bulgaria’s evacuation of Macedonia
resulted in the Albanians extending their security border (not their political
border) southeastwards to the edge of their own ethnic territory, i.e. right to
Skopje and from there to Kumanovo, Presevo and Bujanovce. This expansion of
territory is extremely favourable for the defence of the region against any
enemy attack from the east. The Nationalist bands there have done quite well in
their fighting with the Communists. One can expect resolute defence in this
direction in view of their hatred of the Bulgarians.A direct consequence of the
political and military crisis in the Balkans were the sudden desertions within
the Division, in particular in the sector Tetovo-Gostivar bordering on
Macedonia, where the main body of the men, about 1,000, deserted from the 1st SS
Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment and took their weapons and uniforms with them.
The unreliability of the Albanians was particular evident in Tetovo where an
anti-German demonstration took place one night right after the desertions. And
this, despite the fact that the Albanian recruits in Tetovo were very
well-treated as individuals by their superiors. By 1 October 1944, 3,425
Albanian SS men had deserted.Even guards on their way to relieve other guards
simply disappeared. While guarding a bridge, the detachment having finished its
shift abandoned the men at the two ends of the bridge and deserted en masse,
ten men. All the 30 men in training to learn to ride horses deserted. A combat
reconnaissance detail the size of a platoon simply departed and never returned.
Here again, the lack of German personnel had a direct impact.The Albanian
battalion from the SS ‘Hanschar’ Division was no exception; 697 men deserted.
These men will, however, return to fight on their own territory.In view of the
desertions, the strength of the Division on 1 October 1944 was 3,994 Albanians.
5.Opinion
on the Situation
The task of the Division to secure the Kosovo region
can, for the moment, still be carried out, despite the changed circumstances.
This is due, in particular, to the fact that the broad network of Communist
organizations in the region was destroyed by the Division early in its
existence and the Communists were no longer able to extend their organisations
and spread their propaganda. The Albanians instinctively hate Communism which
they usually regard as a pan-Slavic phenomenon. The Nationalist bands,
especially in the eastern part of the region, are gaining ground morally
because of their resolute will to counter any Bulgarian advance.The Nationalist
bands now sense that they need German protection. They are happy when they have
at least ten German soldiers in their ranks.Admiration for Germany rose once
again when the Anglo-American advance to the Rhine did not result in Germany’s
collapse, as had been expected. Although no one really believes in a German
victory, they no longer believe that Germany will be entirely defeated.The
removal of the withdrawal facilities from the Kosovo region seems also to have
had a purely positive impact on the population.The red bandits in the southern
and western parts of Kosovo are quiet at the moment and seem to be waiting for
the Bulgarian Bolsheviks advancing westwards.
6.Current Organisational Measures
The
mass desertions and the rapprochement of the Nationalist band with the Germans
have resulted together in the decision that the following organisational
measures be taken, depending on the strength of German personnel and the
availability of automatic and heavy infantry weapons:a)The 2nd SS
Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment is to be disbanded; the first and second
battalions are to function as autonomous combat units in the region of Pec
[Peja] and Rozaj [Rožaje].(b)The 3rd Battalion (from the ‘Handschar’) is to be
disbanded and divided into two autonomous combat units, M (Mitrovica) and N
(Novi Pazar), for the region from Podujevo to Tutin. All deserters from the
region of the combat units who are still willing to fight are to be
registered.The remainder of III/2 originating from Kosovo is to be fused with
the Supplies Company and the remainder of the Pioneer Battalion as a 21st SS
Field Replacement Battalion in Prishtina.(c) The 21st SS
Panzer-Jäger Unit (with one functioning anti-tank gun) is to
be transferred from Prishtina to Decani as an autonomous Gebirgs-Jäger combat
unit (12 S Pec).(d)The 21st SS Reconnaissance Unit is to be transformed into a
reinforced Reconnaissance Squadron in Gjakovica.(e) The 21st SS Intelligence
Unit (without transmission equipment) is to be an autonomous combat unit with
two companies in Prizren, one of which on constant surveillance duty on the
Prizren-Gjakovica road.(f)The Veterinary Company is to be transformed into a
veterinary platoon in Prishtina.(g)The two medical companies are to be
transformed into one medical company divided into platoons in Prishtina and
Pec.(h)The 21st SS Mountain Artillery Regiment is to be transformed into a unit
with two batteries (without heavy guns) as an autonomous Gebirgs-Jäger combat
unit in Gnjilane [Gjilan].(i)The remainder of the Staff of the 1st SS
Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment (formerly in Tetovo) is to be divided into a
Railway Security Commando for Kaçanik-Skopje and a Command Staff for eastern
Kosovo in Gnjilane, with subordinate volunteers and one battalion of Albanian
army troops.Responsible for operations on the front are the Nationalist
volunteer bands, comprising some 25,000 men at the moment.Backup and
Reservists: the SS Skanderbeg combat units.The further duties of the autonomous
combat units are:(a)Exerting influence on the Nationalist bands with regard to
organisation, military activity, and tactics.(b)Supplying the bands as far as
possible with food and ammunition.(c) Carrying out short-term training courses
for members of the Nationalist bands (leaders and their deputies first) to
promote military operability, in particular by showing and
doing.(d)Concentration of forces in central Kosovo in case of a major enemy
attack in the region.
7.Annexes(a)Overview
of German personnel,(b)Overview of material and equipment.Division
Commander/signed/ SchmidhuberOberführer
[extract from: August Schmidhuber, Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Aufstellung und
denZustand der 21. Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS
“Skanderbeg”. 2 October 1944, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv,
Freiburg im Breisgau, RS 3-21/1. With the kind assistance of Franziska Zaugg,author
of Albanische Muslime in
der Waffen-SS (Paderborn 2016). Translated from the German
by Robert Elsie.
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